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Introduction 
In its current configuration, the literature on securitisation – the process of integrating an 
issue into a security framework that emphasizes policing and defence – relies mainly on 
two logics. The logic of exception postulates that security is a process designed to combat 
existential threats via exceptional measures. The current benchmark in securitisation 
research, the analytical framework proposed by the Copenhagen School (CoS), relies on the 
logic of exception. In contrast, the logic of routine views security as a collection of 
routinised and patterned practices, typically carried out by bureaucrats and security 
professionals, in which technology comes to hold a prominent place.  
For some scholars, these two approaches to the study of securitisation frame a battleground 
on which a conflict among various structural, critical, cultural, and sociological standpoints 
is waged. Indeed, a fair amount of discussion among proponents of both logics takes the 
form of competition: advocates on each side of the debate attempt to refute the criticisms 
levelled against their own framework in order to illuminate that framework’s ontological 
priority. Although many graduate students cut their theoretical teeth on these debates, little 
has been gained thus far in the battle for possession of the field.  
By questioning the literature’s underlying understanding of these two logics as opposing 
and competing, I pursue two aims in this article. First, I seek to bolster current research on 
the securitisation process by moving the conversation away from its current analytical 
stalemate. I claim that sophisticated empirical studies reveal elements of both exception and 
routine in the securitisation process, and argue that these studies call implicitly for further 
investigation into the coexistence and complementarity of the two logics. I caution scholars 
against overdrawing distinctions between the two logics, for it is not clear that they are 
mutually exclusive. Second, I seek to recognize and harness the strengths of both logics, 
and to identify the fruitful theoretical “bricks” each framework contributes to our 
understanding of securitisation. Throughout this discussion, I focus on the factors that unite 
securitisation scholars, rather than those which separate them. Consolidating securitisation 
scholarship in this way will allow us to better connect our theoretical models with 
contemporary security politics. By opening new avenues of research and problematizing 
issues that have been politely neglected by advocates of both logics, we can also counter 
the strong tendency in recent years to pull the security debate within competing ‘camps’.  
With these goals in mind, I put forward three main arguments in this article. First, I contend 
that each of the logic of exception and the logic of routine, on its own, presents an 
incomplete picture of the securitisation process; thus, each theoretical camp fails to present 
a convincing framework for the study of securitisation. The incompleteness of these logics 
manifests itself on multiple fronts, including their understanding of change and recurrence, 
their visualization of the securitisation process, and their identification of securitising 
agents. Second, I argue that the two logics share two important commonalities: security 
performance and path dependence. The securitisation process is first and foremost about a 
performance – a process of doing something – and refers to decisions that are socio-
historically informed. Finally, I contend that moving forward together will help scholars to 
study the coexistence of development and change, critical junctures and recurrence, and 
transformation and reproduction.  
What I do not intend to do in this article is to present a synthesis disguised as a discussion 
of complementarities, or to argue that one logic is ontologically prior to the other, or to 
champion the explanatory leverage of one logic over the other. My objective is not to 
propose a new comprehensive theory of securitisation that draws from both logics, nor is it 
to revisit all of the flaws previously identified in both the logic of exception and the logic of 
routine, let alone to offer correctives or provide a refinement of either logic.  
The body of this article will proceed as follows. The first section presents an overview of 
the logic of exception and the logic of routine as currently applied and organised in 
securitisation research. The second section levels a theoretical critique at the two logics by 
underscoring the incompleteness of each logic in isolation.1 The third section provides a 
brief outline of some areas of common ground to foster the development of a convincing 
research agenda. Finally, in the fourth section, I illustrate the preceding set of arguments 
through an analysis of the social construction of migration as a security threat in France 
since the end of the Cold War. 
                                                
1 Undoubtedly, there are numerous methodological, theoretical, and normative issues concerning 
the concepts of exception and routine. Although these issues have inspired substantial disagreement 
among scholars, it is not within this article’s purview to engage with them in detail. 
The logic of exception and the logic of routine 
The literature on securitisation draws mainly from two logics. The logic of exception, 
inspired primarily by Carl Schmitt’s2 work on the subject, focuses on speech acts that 
legitimize exceptional policies and practices in the face of an existential security threat. The 
current benchmark in securitisation research, the CoS,3 relies on the logic of exception, as 
do most researchers in the area of “visual securitisation.”4 The CoS posits that labeling 
something as a security issue imbues that issue with a sense of importance that legitimizes 
the use of emergency measures extending beyond the usual political processes. A security 
speech act not only describes a state of affairs but also determines appropriate ways of 
acting and participating in relation to that state of affairs. Securitisation research seeks to 
understand the process by which an issue is cast as an existential threat to a designated 
referent object. Yet, securitising agents cannot navigate freely toward successful 
securitisation. Security speech acts must follow the grammar of security, securitising actors 
must possess social capital and power to legitimize their securitising moves, and the 
audience of a security speech act must accept proposed securitising moves as legitimate.  
Contrasting with the logic of exception is the logic of routine. Inspired by Michel 
Foucault’s and Pierre Bourdieu’s systems of thought,5 the logic of routine sees 
securitisation as a process of establishing and inscribing meaning through governmentality 
and practices. It sees the securitisation process as consisting of a series of routinised and 
                                                
2 (Schmitt, 1985 [1922], 1996 [1932])  
3 (Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995)  
4 (Hansen, 2011) The literature on the CoS is vast, see (Balzacq, 2005; Bourbeau, 2011; Cory, 2012; 
Curley & Herington, 2011; Floyd, 2011; Guzzini, 2011; Holbaard & Pedersen, 2012; McDonald, 
2008; Vuori, 2008; Williams, 2003) 
5 (Foucault, 1994, 2007) (Bourdieu, 1990, 1991) 
patterned practices, carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals, in which 
technology holds a prominent place.  
The logic of routine is embraced by a broad set of scholars, each of whom brings to the 
table their own focus and influences.6 Didier Bigo, in particular, is a central figure in 
scholarship on the logic of routine. He argues that security is not necessarily about survival, 
nor is it about urgency. Rather, security is largely defined by mundane bureaucratic 
decisions and practices that create a sense of insecurity and unease. Security, according to 
Bigo, is “an attempt at insecuritisation of daily life by the security professionals and an 
increase in the strengths of police potential for action.”7 In the context of the securitisation 
of migration, security is a “transversal political technology, used as a mode of 
governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease, or to encourage it if it does 
not yet exist, so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security.”8  
A sense of incompleteness 
Building on the previous discussion, I wish here to level a theoretical critique at both the 
logic of exception and the logic of routine. I argue that, when considered separately, both 
theoretical stances offer an incomplete picture of the contemporary process of 
securitisation. The incompleteness of each of these logics is expressed in many ways, of 
which I only underscore the most important ones: (i) the issue of continuity and change, (ii) 
the question of who can be a securitising agent, and (iii) the depiction of the securitisation 
process.  
                                                
6 (Balzacq, 2011; Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2006)  
7 (Bigo, 2001, p. 111) 
8 (Bigo, 2002, p. 65) 
Continuity and change are concepts that the logic of exception and the logic of routine, 
respectively, struggle to theorize convincingly. Focusing only on moments and places of 
exception neglects the numerous ways in which security practices are reproduced 
consistently across time and space. Unless we accept the proposition that we are living in a 
permanent state of exception where exception itself is the rule,9 the CoS model is ill-
equipped to deal with the idea that mechanisms of security are proliferating and generating 
a constant sense of insecurity, fear, and danger.10 Conversely, an exclusive focus on routine 
practices does not allow room to account for change, critical junctures, or the impacts of 
‘window of opportunities’ on contemporary security affairs. The logic of routine makes a 
strong case for the enduring characteristics of the social world, but less so for the sources of 
change and critical junctures. This conclusion is echoed by Raymond Duvall and Arjun 
Chowdhury, for whom the current analysis of practices not only falls short of offering 
satisfying ways of theorizing change in world politics but also generates an exaggerated 
sense of stability.11 The logic of routine has so far failed to produce guiding principles to 
make sense of key moments of change in the securitisation process, where actors step out of 
adopted boundaries and transcend the field of action in which they are normally engaged.  
A second area in which both logics present an incomplete account is the question of who 
can be a securitising agent. The CoS focuses almost exclusively on sovereign and elite 
politics.12 Unsurprisingly, Schmitt’s often-quoted remark that “sovereign is he who decides 
upon the exception” has been employed to argue that the CoS has an elite bias. In her 
                                                
9 For a discussion on this issue see (Agamben, 2005) 
10 (Balzacq, 2005; Huysmans, 2011; McDonald, 2008) 
11 (Duvall & Chowdhury, 2011) 
12 For a study that employs the CoS and opens the analysis to other securitising agents see 
(Bourbeau, 2011, 2013b) 
investigation of civilian border patrol groups at the US-Mexico borders, Roxanne Doty 
argues that the logic of exception’s focus on elite politics fails to capture the complete 
picture of contemporary security politics.13 Jef Huysmans has also argued that the CoS 
“implies an elitist vision of politics,”14 while members of the c.a.s.e. collective contend that 
the CoS’s position “risks the reification of dramatic elite exceptionalist discourses.”15  
The logic of routine likewise encounters difficulties in the identification of potential 
securitising agents, and ultimately presents an incomplete and restrictive understanding of 
the securitising agent role. Bigo’s version of the logic of routine, which focuses almost 
exclusively on security professionals, wrongly assumes that securitising agents are 
positioned on a map of social power in fixed ways. His model fails to distinguish between 
having the authorization to speak and having the ability to speak with authority. As Judith 
Butler points out, it is indeed possible that one can speak with authority without being 
authorized to speak.16 Thus, restricting the scope of securitising agents to security 
professionals limits more than it reveals in the context of contemporary security studies. 
Furthermore, various studies have demonstrated that the securitisation process involves 
other agents than security professionals, such as media agents, religious actors, and 
NGOs.17 
Both logics are limited in how they depict the securitisation process. While recognizing the 
existence of routinised security practices, the logic of exception argues that what really 
matters are key moments in the process. Indeed, advocates of the logic of exception 
                                                
13 (Doty, 2007) 
14 (Huysmans, 2011, p. 375) 
15 (2006, p. 466) 
16 (Butler, 1997) 
17 (Barthwal-Datta, 2009; Hansen, 2011; Karyotis & Patrikios, 2010) 
consider only the high points (security speech acts), and not the plateaus on the road to 
securitisation, to be theoretically significant. The logic of exception argues that routinized 
practices are nothing more than practices in which urgency is implicitly assumed; hence, 
urgency is institutionalized. By paying little attention to routinised practices for the sake of 
theoretical parsimony, the logic of exception eschews the possibility of gradual 
intensification of the securitisation process.18 
In contrast, the logic of routine overlooks the significance of security “high points” to focus 
on a theoretically flat view of the securitisation process as a routinised, patterned, and 
(often) unintentional set of practices. Some advocates of the logic of routine question the 
very existence of high points (speech acts), while others argue that these high points are 
themselves simply routinised practices. However, the logic of routine provides little 
guidance on differentiating between political practices and security practices. The upshot is 
that advocates of a practice ontology must either decide to curtail the admission of all 
practices or admit the need to judge and select even within a practice perspective. There is a 
need to justify and inform the reader of the basis on which a selection is made and why 
some practices are linked to security while others are not19. 
In short, the logic of exception perceives the securitisation process as binary (either there 
are high points or there is no securitisation), while the logic of routine understand it as flat 
(perceived high points are merely patterned practices); as a result of these limitations, each 
of these logics, when taken alone, offers an unconvincing account of today’s contemporary 
security politics. 
                                                
18 (Williams, 2011) 
19 See (Bourbeau, 2013a) 
Focusing on common analytical grounds 
While there has been a tendency among security scholars to consolidate into particular, 
competing camps or schools, I argue that there is a need for us to zoom in on 
commonalities rather than differences. As Hansen (2008) puts it, we need to “move [away] 
from the tyranny of small differences to [the] study of common analytical issues.”20 The 
present section does not aim to develop a comprehensive theory or full-fledged synthesis of 
the securitisation process, but to recognize and harness the strengths of both logics, and to 
identify fruitful theoretical foundations.21 Identifying fruitful commonalities among 
opposing viewpoints is fundamental to advancing theoretical research on the securitisation 
process and developing a richer dialogue between ideas and empirical evidence. In the 
following pages, I lay out two main conceptual elements that are relevant to this pursuit: 
performance and path dependence.  
Performance 
Drawing on both the analytical axioms of the CoS and Emanuel Alder & Vincent Pouliot’s 
take on the ‘practice turn’ in International Relationship (IR), I argue that securitisation is 
first and foremost about performance. Indeed, Wæver and Buzan have been arguing since 
the late 1990s that “the process of securitisation is what in language theory is called a 
speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance 
itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, 
                                                
20 (Hansen, 2008, p. 652) See also (Fierke, 2007; Sylvester, 2007; Vuori, 2014) 
21 It is also important to note that the objective of the article is not to revisit all of the flaws in either 
the logic of exception or the logic of routine, let alone to offer correctives to these limits.  
naming a ship).”22 Speech acts do not simply describe an existing security situation; 
through their act or practice component, they actually (re)define a given issue as a security 
question. Adler & Pouliot’s recent proposal is similar. Following Foucault, they argue that 
“not only is language the conduit of meaning, which turns practices into the location and 
engine of social action, but it is itself an enactment or doing in the form of ‘discursive 
practices’ [...] discursive practices, thus, are socially meaningful speech acts, according to 
which saying is doing.”23 
Crucially, scholars from various camps all seem to agree that the securitisation process is 
first and foremost about security performance. Stressing a shared understanding of security 
performance opens the debate in two fruitful ways. First, it better connects the role of 
exceptionalist security discourses with contemporary security politics. The CoS’s premise 
(or threshold) that the securitisation process can only be initiated by a security speech act is 
flawed, both theoretically and empirically, and little has been gained so far by following 
this path. Ample evidence suggests that security speech acts are not the inescapable and 
exclusive initiators of the securitisation process. On some occasions, speech acts only seek 
to legitimize established security practices – even though these speech acts may be made 
under the umbrella of exception as if existing security practices were non-existent.  
Second, it helps to mitigate the strong tendency of the logic of routine to picture the 
securitisation process as flat. Critical moments, in which agents step out of routinised 
practices and habitual boundaries to transcend the field of action, do exist in contemporary 
world politics. On some occasions, political discourses represent a critical juncture or 
                                                
22 (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26) 
23 (Adler & Pouliot, 2011, p. 16) See also (Epstein, 2008) 
turning point that profoundly transforms security practices so that they are no longer 
routinised, unintentional and unreflective. As an advocate of the practice turn in IR points 
out, “changes in global political discourses [...] opened up the possibility for initiating new 
practices.”24 
Path dependence 
In his study on institutions and the politics of the state, John Ikenberry characterizes 
political development as involving critical junctures and developmental pathways.25 
Critical junctures are commonly defined as “choice points that put countries (or other units) 
onto paths of development that track certain outcomes – as opposed to others – and that 
cannot be easily broken or reversed”26. Developmental pathways suggest that a security 
architecture is deeply influenced by past trajectories and decisions, that the securitized 
understanding of an issue tends to get established at critical moments, and that, once set in 
motion, a securitisation pathway is difficult to alter. 
The study of critical junctures is slowly making its way from comparative politics 
(particularly historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism),27 to IR 
scholarship, as exemplified by the recent article of Orfeo Fioretos.28 In the subfield of 
securitisation research, I have highlighted the role of critical junctures in the securitisation 
of migration in Canada and France and the link between resilience and security studies.29 
                                                
24 (Neumann, 2002, p. 648) 
25 (Ikenberry, 1994) 
26 (Mahoney, 2001, p. 7) 
27 (Capoccia & Keleman, 2007; Collier & Collier, 1991; Soifer, 2012) 
28 (Fioretos, 2011) 
29 (Bourbeau, 2011, 2013c, forthcoming) 
However, as James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen30 have recently noted, work on critical 
junctures tends to insufficiently problematize the process by which the outcomes of critical 
junctures are translated into lasting legacies. In other words, by neglecting the mechanisms 
of reproduction, scholarship on critical junctures fails to provide insight into the means by 
which security understanding and structures get “locked in.” 
This is where the logic of routine is particularly useful. By emphasizing patterned, 
unreflective, and routinised security practices, this framework helps us to gain a better 
understanding of the dynamics by which the securitisation process is reproduced. 
Securitising agents often reproduce the same security logic across various domains. Agents 
carry their existing practices or habits forward when facing “new” situations. Hence, the 
securitisation process is reproduced and eventually “locked in.”  
By thinking about securitisation in the context of this dual lineage of critical junctures and 
of recurrence, we allow for coexistence and complementarity between the reproduction and 
transformation processes, and hence open up the possibility of understanding the roles of 
both change and continuity in securitisation. 
Hypothesizing the relationship 
There are many different ways to think about the coexistence and complementarity between 
routinised security practices and exceptionalist security discourses. We might consider, for 
example, a sequential understanding of this relationship. For instance, we might postulate 
that security speech acts initiate the securitisation process, while security practices “lock 
in” the securitisation. Seen in this light, the logic of exception is useful in its ability to 
                                                
30 (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) 
pinpoint securitising discourses that spring up at particular points in time, while the logic of 
routine is able to underscore the reproductive mechanisms of securitisation once the process 
has been started. There are reasons to believe that advocates of the logic of exception would 
concur with such a view of securitisation.  
Alternatively, we might pursue the opposite approach and propose that security practices 
are implemented before security discourses occur; in this case, the role of security 
discourses is to legitimize and institutionalize a pre-existing situation. Under this view, 
routinized security practices are understood to occur away from public attention, while 
security discourses are simply an after-the-fact public opinion strategy; ‘behind the scenes’ 
realities would thus be considered more telling than ‘in the spotlight’ theatricalities. This 
standpoint would sit neatly with the logic of routine. 
Asking questions about which logic has primacy locks the scholarship into a sequential 
analysis of the securitization process. Arguing for the primacy of one logic over the other 
requires that the scholar be able to hold constant throughout one’s investigation several 
distinct components of the on-going and complex process of securitisation. The social 
world we live in is a world of feedback, in which the feasibility of postulating a clear 
demarcation between securitising discourses and practices is under fire. The gist of the 
argument presented here is that although the logics might constitute different stages of the 
securitization process, the logics interact in a complex and wider range of ways.31 To be 
sure, focusing on a single logic is sometimes a necessary analytical convenience when one 
is conducting a study. However, I posit that the question we really need to ask is not, 
“Which logic comes first?” but rather, “How do these two logics reinforce each other?”. 
                                                
31 I thank one reviewer for highlighting this point.  
Developing a deeper understanding of the securitisation process requires that we step 
beyond a sequential understanding. By searching for elements of both exceptionalist 
security discourses and routinized security practices across time and across cases, scholars 
will get a clearer, more comprehensive sense of the securitisation process.  
The securitisation of migration in France 
The construction of migration as a security threat in post-Cold War France provides a 
useful case study through which to illustrate the coexistence of both the logic of exception 
and the logic of routine. Passionate debates about the link (or lack thereof) between 
immigration and security concerns have taken place in France over the past several 
decades. The issue of securitized migration in France has thus received extensive analysis, 
leading to a rich availability of sources.32 As the next pages will show, both securitisation 
logics have come into play in the development of a French national stance on immigration, 
which supports the contention that the two logics can co-exist. Furthermore, the dominant 
discourse framing the French understanding of migration has shifted dramatically in the 
past thirty years. Previously viewed as a solution to economic and demographic problems, 
international migration has more recently begun to provoke apprehension and mistrust 
among French citizens and politicians, while at the same time on-going immigration has 
cast long-established patterns of socio-cultural identity into troubled waters in post-Cold 
War France. This social (re)construction of international migration as a security threat 
(rather than a solution to economic/demographic problems) provides fertile ground for an 
illustration of the coexistence of the logics of routine and exception. 
                                                
32 See among many others, (Basaran, 2008; Bigo, 2002; Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002) 
Building on previous contributions, I aim to show in this section that not only were the 
logic of exception and the logic of routine both at play in the process of securitising 
international migration in France during the post-Cold War period, but that security 
performances and critical junctures/path dependence were important factors in the move to 
recast security as the dominant lens through which international migration is understood. 
To pursue this claim, I focus on security practices concerned with migrant detention and on 
the discourses of political/media agents.33 I show that, contra the logic of exception, 
migrant detention security practices were essential to the process of securitising 
international migrants in France. These practices were not only important for ‘locking in’ 
the process and reproducing securitisation mechanisms over time, but also played a vital 
role in initiating the securitisation process. On the other hand, by focusing on security 
speech acts, I show that these are not simply discourses or banal speeches, but that, contra 
the logic of routine, they constitute a crucial vector in the social construction of migration 
as a security issue.  
There are two types of migrant detention facilities in France: waiting zones (officially 
called zones d’attente) and administrative holding centres (centres de rétention 
administratif). In both types of detention facilities, the procedures, codes of conduct, and 
apparatus of operation are strikingly similar to those of incarceration facilities – as if the 
                                                
33 It is important to point out that, although as part of this discussion I necessarily highlight the 
particular patterns of engagement of some agents with the securitisation process, the analysis in this 
section is not intended as a theoretical statement on who constitutes a securitising agent. Similarly, 
although this article focuses on actors involved in the securitisation of migration, my emphasis is 
not on the authors of securitisation. Relatedly, laying out a model of the interactions between non-
governmental and governmental efforts to securitize migration is a much-needed research project. 
However, it is, sadly, beyond the scope of the present article.  
“solution” to the issue of criminality were simply being (re)applied to a different 
“problem”. 
The past decades have witnessed both the crystallisation of enforcement responses to 
migration control and the institutionalisation of detention as a security practice. In July 
1992, the French Parliament passed the Quilès law, named after the then-Minister of the 
Interior, that recognised the existing practice of detaining migrants and which introduced a 
new Article (Article “35 quater”) to the Ordonnance of 1945 (which laid down the basic 
outline of immigration and naturalisation policy in post-war France). The Article 
understands detention centres as encompassing both spaces of departure and arrival, and 
spaces where people are controlled; these centres may be located in international airports, 
ports, or train stations. In the early 1990s, there were about eighty detention centres in 
France, in which a migrant could be legally detained for a maximum of twenty days.  
The Quilès law was introduced in response to a considerable global surge in migratory 
movements that took place in the early 1990s. Worldwide, the number of refugees rose 
from nine million in 1984 to a peak of eighteen million in 1992; in France, this surge gave 
rise to all sorts of foreboding projections and scenarios, and seared in citizens’ minds the 
fearful image of uncontrollable, unstoppable waves of refugees. Actual numbers pointed in 
a different direction, however. In fact, as Graph 1 shows, the official number of refugee 
applications to France showed a significant decrease in the period from 1990 to 1996. In 
absolute terms, the total numbers of refugee applicants in France decreased from 61,000 to 
29,000 between 1989 and 1992. The number of asylum seekers as a percentage of the total 
population of France decreased as well, from 10.7% in 1989 to 5.1% in 1992: a 50% 
reduction in only four years.  
Graph 1. Asylum applications and percentage of asylum 
seekers in total accepted immigrants in France, 1989-1996. 
 
Source: Institut nationale de la statistique et des études 
économiques, Les immigrés en France, Paris, République française, 2005.  
 
 
In this case, not only were the actual numbers sidelined, but security also had to be 
performed. The worldwide surge in refugee numbers gave French securitising agents the 
opportunity, if they were so inclined, to present international migration as a security threat 
that required an urgent and strong national response.  
One of the factors that have contributed to the discursive trend linking immigration to 
national security is the now-famous remarks made by Socialist Prime Minister Michel 
Rocard in January 1990: “France is no longer an immigration country […]. We cannot 
welcome all the misery of the world.”34 His successor, Prime Minister Édith Cresson, 
surprised many fellow Socialists when she admitted in May 1991 that, “it is true, a feeling 
of insecurity, individual and collective, is strong.” In September of the same year, Cresson 
organised charter flights to ensure and speed up the deportation of unwanted migrants.35  
                                                
34 (Rocard, 1990) Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.  
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These strong statements concerning immigration were soon followed by security speech 
acts. In November 1991, Minister of the Interior Philippe Marchand (who served in office 
January 1991 to April 1992) argued that “uncontrolled migratory movement would be a 
threat against [France’s] fundamental national interest” and France’s security.36 His 
successor, Paul Quilès (April 1992 to March 1993), further argued that irregular 
immigration was a security threat to France’s sovereignty and society. Quilès spoke of the 
threat of irregular migration on a number of occasions, arguing that regaining control over 
immigration was essential to maintaining social cohesion in France. Irregular and 
clandestine immigration were among his nine security targets, and had to be fought 
accordingly.37 
Media agents of the time, and particularly those working for centre-right/rightwing 
newspapers, were quick to present a security understanding of the issue. An analysis of all 
the editorials published by Le Figaro, one of the most important newspapers in France, 
which boasted a weekly circulation of two million copies during the early 1990s, reveals 
that the editorialists fiercely and repeatedly presented immigration as an existential security 
threat to France. The government was advised by Le Figaro’s editorialists to understand the 
fight against immigration as a “new form of war” if it wanted to be successful.38 References 
to existential threat, emergency measures, and survival of the nation are found throughout 
the editorials of the time. As early as 1990, editorialists were arguing that “we must 
suspend immigration, or else anything is possible: the country is on the verge of burning 
                                                
36 (Marchand, 1991) 
37 (Quilès, 1992a, 1992b) 
38 (Marchetti, 1995) 
fiercely,”39 and that immigration was “de-structuralising French society.”40 Others 
contended that France’s national identity was profoundly at risk.41 Still others openly 
wondered whether France had a future as a nation, since “the wave will never stop 
growing.”42 
The victory of the Rally for the Republic in the legislative election of 1993 solidified the 
saliency of the migratory threat and set the tone for the securitisation of migration. The 
early 1990s was no ordinary period in the history of France, according to then-Prime 
Minister Édouard Balladur (March 1993 to May 1995). In fact, it was “the most difficult 
period since the war,” and one which necessitated a bridging of the traditional left/right 
political division in order to tackle effectively the problem. Balladur argued that, if 
measures to fight clandestine immigration were not implemented, then “what is happening 
elsewhere will happen in France: principles to which we are profoundly attached [will be 
put] in serious peril.”43  
The sense of an existential security threat was most spectacularly captured in the mandate 
of Charles Pasqua, Minister of the Interior in the Balladur government (March 1993 to May 
1995). Pasqua pushed for the securitisation of clandestine/irregular migration in an 
unprecedented way, and formulated strong security speech acts in which urgency, fear of 
social explosion, and survival of the French nation were recurrent themes. In his first 
speech as Minister, Pasqua stated that “clandestine immigration is a new phenomenon that 
                                                
39 (Giesbert, 1990a) 
40 (Giesbert, 1990b) 
41 (Lambroschini, 1992; Marchetti, 1993, 1995) 
42 (Rioufol, 1996) 
43 (Balladur, 1993) 
we urgently need to combat if we do not want to see our national cohesion explode.”44 He 
reiterated this position in several speeches, sometimes speaking in terms of the loss of 
French identity,45 sometimes highlighting the necessity to protect the “national community” 
from threatening “perils,”46 and sometimes contending that irregular migration could lead 
to France’s social “explosion.”47 The stakes were so high, according to Pasqua, that his bill, 
which reinforced repressive measures to impede access to French territory and limited the 
entry and residence of several categories of migrants, constituted the “last chance to save 
France’s integration model”.48 
While the securitisation process did involved key moments where actors stepped beyond 
accepted boundaries and transcended the field of routinised action, the routinised security 
practice of detaining migrants was undeniably a significant axiom in securitising migration. 
Indeed, concurrent with the emergence of exceptionalist security discourses in the context 
of international migration, marginal but numerous changes were also made to the security 
practice of detaining migrants, thereby ensuring a developmental pathway to the 
securitisation of migration. For example, in 1994, the location of detention centres in 
French territory was broadened to include inland train stations. In 1995, non-government 
organisations and other organisations, such as the UNHCR and the Red Cross, gained 
partial access to these detention centres. Three years later, access for these organisations 
was slightly increased, both in terms of the number of organisations allowed on site and in 
terms of the type/quality of access. The institutionalisation of migrant detention as a 
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security practice was also gradual: while there were about 3,900 migrant-detainees in 1992, 
there were 5,000 in 1996, and more than 7,000 in 1998. The establishment of this practice, 
which succeeded by generating a sense of insecurity, fear, and danger to which migrant 
detention was the proffered solution, was essential in ensuring a gradual intensification of 
mechanisms of security in France throughout the final years of the twentieth century  
At the same time that these developments in security practices were helping to “lock in” the 
dominant French response to the issue of international migration, the discursive 
construction of immigration as an existential security threat was intensifying. An analysis 
of speeches by Pasqua’s successor as Minister of the Interior, Jean-Louis Debré (May 1995 
to June 1997), reveals that security speech acts in the context of international migration 
were made repeatedly, and that Debré justified them on the basis of emergency, social 
cohesion and explosion, and survival of France’s collective identity. For instance, Debré 
argued that to give up in the face of the threat posed by migration to France, “would be too 
great a risk for our social cohesion [...] and for our nation, as irregular immigrants induce 
racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism”.49 In another speech, he further contended that 
citizens rightly turn to the State to “ensure their security” and the “calmness of their 
society” in the face of “important and recurring” migration flows; as Minister of the 
Interior, he assured them, he intended to fulfill this mandate.50  
The return of a Socialist government to the National Assembly in June 1997 changed the 
discursive landscape on security issues. In contrast with the harsh rhetoric of the previous 
administration, the new Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, talked about international migration 
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in rather positive terms in his first Declaration of General Policy.51 What is important in the 
context of this study, however, is that, while it is possible to observe a significant softening 
in the tone of official discourses on migration during this period, the sedimentation of 
security practices was already well under way during Jospin’s regime. In other words, 
despite the moderate tone of the speeches being presented publically, security practices 
were still being implemented and reinforced. This dichotomy again underscores the 
complementarity of the logic of exception and the logic of routine in the securitisation of 
migration. By 1997, the French understanding of international migration had already been 
locked into a particular “securitised” path of development that would prove difficult to 
break away from.  
As an example of this new reality, consider a situation that arose in February 2001, when 
the East Sea, a rusting Cambodian-flagged freighter, was beached by its crew on the rocks 
near the tiny port of Boulouris on the French Riviera. The captain fled the boat, leaving it 
facing land, the propellers turned so that the boat could not return to sea. Crammed into the 
decrepit and stinking boat were 910 Turkish Kurd migrants – 250 men, 180 women, and 
480 children, including 200 children under the age of five. The migrants were packed so 
tightly that they could not even sit down. After seven days at sea, dehydration and 
malnourishment were rampant.  
This was the first case in recent years of a large contingent of immigrants attempting to 
enter France by ship. The grounding of the East Sea resulted in a groundswell of emotions 
across France, and could have easily induced bold security speech acts by key political 
agents to the effect that these incidents were threatening France’s security and social 
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cohesion. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister made no declaration to that effect. Instead, 
security practices were quietly put into place. Within hours after the breaching of the East 
Sea, French authorities transformed the military base of Fréjus near Cannes into an 
improvised detention centre. Turkish Kurd men, women and children were all sent in 
requisitioned buses to the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment base and detained as illegal 
immigrants. This was a powerful symbol of the state’s attempt to securitise migration. It 
also brought back memories of Europe’s treatment of Jewish refugees when, for three 
weeks in the summer of 1947, more than 4,500 Jews sat packed in sweltering heat aboard 
three British prison ships near Marseilles on the French Riviera.52 
The socialist government and the opposition joined forces in denouncing the newcomers as 
illegal immigrants. The wording of this denunciation was of crucial importance, since it had 
the consequence of disqualifying any claim of political asylum on the part of the 
immigrants: the East Sea passengers were publicly considered illegal rather than genuine 
refugees. All the would-be Turkish Kurd immigrants were held in a detention centre 
without any freedom of movement. The key message put forward by the socialist 
government of the time was that the security practice of detaining migrants on a military 
base was an appropriate and justified policy in the face of such migratory movements; 
again, this situation illustrates how exceptionalist discourse and routinized practices 
intersect profoundly with each other in the process of securitising migration.  
The story of the East Sea also illustrates how the securitisation process is infused with 
security practices that ensure the reproduction of mechanisms of security to generate a 
sense of insecurity and threat. It suggests that Pouliot and other Bourdieusians in IR are 
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right in arguing that people sometimes replicate behaviours through practice, and that an 
individual’s habitus inclines or disposes each agent to perform or replicate certain 
practices.53 
In 2003, a new amendment to the Ordonnance of 1945 was passed, increasing the period of 
time that migrants could be held in detention from 20 to 32 days. This bill further 
established the centrality of the security practice of detention to the management of the 
migration-security nexus, In March 2010, yet another amendment to the Ordonnance, the 
Immigration, Integration and Nationality bill, gave the state the authority to create a 
detention centre wherever undocumented migrants were found in French territory – hence, 
anywhere in the country.  
Further illustration of the coexistence of exceptionalist security speech acts and routinized 
security practices can be observed well into the 2000s. An analysis of the complete set of 
speeches given by President Nicolas Sarkozy, Ministers of the Interior Brice Hortefeux and 
Claude Guéant reveals that several security speech acts were delivered in France 
throughout the first decade of the 21st century, and that these security speech acts have 
contributed to the ongoing securitisation of migration. Nearly every observer of France’s 
immigration policy has noted the security turn taken during the Sarkozy presidency (May 
2007 to May 2012). The notion that France should have a better selection process for 
migrants was one of the key themes during the first years of Sarkozy’s presidential 
mandate; the notion that irregular migration constitutes a security threat for France 
resurfaced thereafter.54  
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However, it was not until the summer of 2010 that a critical rupture occurred to clearly put 
French immigration policy on the path toward stronger securitisation of migration. On July 
30, 2010, about ten days after clashes between youth and police set several cars on fire and 
burned an annex of city hall in Grenoble, Sarkozy flew to the southeastern French city to 
make a fierce speech condemning violence. During this speech, he placed a large portion of 
the blame for this violence on insufficiently regulated immigration. Describing the events 
as being of “extreme severity,” Sarkozy said that he wanted “to revoke the French 
citizenship of immigrants who endanger the life of police officers or other public 
authorities, or who are convicted of crimes like polygamy and female circumcision.” 
French nationality is earned, he declared, and one must prove oneself worthy of it. “When 
you open fire on a member of the police force, you’re no longer worthy of being French.”  
Not only did these events require from the government a firm response, but they also 
offered a unique opportunity to rethink France’s “policy on immigration and security,” 
according to the president. Sarkozy further declared that France was “suffering from fifty 
years of insufficiently regulated immigration that have led to a failure of integration.” “We 
have decided to declare a war against traffickers and criminals,” he insisted, “A war that 
will last several years and that goes well beyond the power of one government or one 
political party.”55 Even though not all students of French immigration policy employ the 
concept of securitisation to describe the nature and implications of Sarkozy’s speech, they 
all agree that the main elements of the speech were urgency, existential threats, historical 
turning points, rupture, and the need for immediate action: elements at the heart of the logic 
of exception.  
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Following the events of late July 2010, Interior Minister Hortefeux (June 2009 to February 
2011) pledged to begin enforcing new security measures. Criticism of these measures was 
brushed off with the claim, “We’re waging a national war against insecurity.”56 When 
Guéant became Interior Minister in February 2011, he followed the same lines as his 
predecessor, giving himself two missions: “to improve security and to fight against 
irregular immigration.” He argued that France was confronted with a major challenge, and 
that the country needed to take all necessary measures to ensure that French society would 
not change, and that France “keeps its civilisation.”57 Guéant declared that he agreed with 
Front National leader Marine Le Pen that there are too many immigrants already in France, 
and that accepting an additional 200,000 immigrants annually was excessive.58 In a speech 
given in September 2011, Guéant argued that a coherent immigration policy was required 
for France’s cohesion, a policy that would include a strong and active fight against irregular 
migration.59 He also contended that France was going through a major asylum-seekers 
crisis, which had already caused a severe abuse of the refugee determination system and 
that ultimately threatened to undermine France’s social cohesion. He advocated for the 
adoption of urgent and far-reaching measures, and exhorted France to stop turning a blind 
eye to the grave danger of “communautarisme.” In another speech, Guéant proclaimed that 
the government position was clear: those that France is generous enough to welcome within 
its society should “aim for assimilation.”60  
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Echoes of these security speech acts can also be found in Le Figaro editorials from the 
same time. In 2008, migration flows were still being editorially characterised as “anarchic,” 
“massive,” and in need of a realistic immigration policy that highlights the importance of 
strengthening the frontiers of Europe.61 Editorialists during these years argue that European 
leaders should embrace Sarkozy’s policy of migration flow control, claiming that, if Europe 
and France do not act quickly and firmly, the social cohesion of all European societies will 
be in danger.62 According to several editorials, after more than thirty years of a general 
attitude of laissez-faire towards migration flow, France has reached a crucial point where 
national cohesion is on the line. Because national and social cohesion is at stake, the 
editorialists argue that the country should welcome Hortefeux’s proposal that prospective 
migrants be required to take a DNA tests to prove their link to relatives already living in 
France.63 
The institutionalisation, acceptability, and prevalence of detaining migrants as a security 
practice gained new heights in the 2000s. The number of migrant-detainees rose from an 
average of about 6,000 migrant-detainees per year in the 1990s, to more than 35,000 in 
2000, to 45,000 in 2006, to reach a staggering 56,000 in 2011; this represents an increase of 
more than a thousand per cent, as Graph 2 illustrates.64 Whereas the number of migrant-
detainees represented less than four per cent of the total number of accepted immigrants in 
1992, it represented nearly twenty-five per cent in 2009, and just short of thirty per cent in 
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2011. In other words, for every ten immigrants accepted in 2011, nearly three were 
detained.65  
Graph 2. Total Immigrant Detainees and Percentage of Immigrant 
Detainees vs. Total Accepted Immigrants in France, 1992-2011. 
  
Source: Direction de la population et des migrations, Rapport Annuel 2004, Paris, République 
Française, 2005; Comité interministérielle du contrôle des migrations, Rapport au Parlement. 
Les chiffres de la politique d’immigration et d’intégration, Paris, République Française, 2011.  
 
 
What these official numbers make clear is that migrant detention has come to be seen as a 
security practice that is available to the authorities to assist in their aim of controlling 
migration. This security practice is embedded in the state’s regulations and norms and, as 
such, fully participates in the social construction of international migration as a security 
question in France. It also suggests that the dominant understanding of international 
migration in France has come to stress danger and threat to such an extent that the ideas, 
discourses, and practices of security have become embedded within French institutions in 
significant and profound ways. 
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Conclusion 
An analysis of social mechanisms involved in the securitisation of migration in France 
illustrates the multiple points of intersection between the logic of routine and the logic of 
exception and the usefulness of emphasising security performances and path-
dependence/critical junctures. Considering these two logics in tandem allows for the 
emergence of a more complete picture of the social construction of migration as a threat to 
France’s national security and social cohesion than either logic does when considered 
alone.  
Securitisation research has become one of the most dynamic areas of research in security 
studies and International Relations in recent years. After twenty years of detailed empirical 
and theoretical research on the logics of exception and routine, there is a need to cut across 
these divides and to shift the discussion towards the factors that unite security scholars 
rather than those that separate us. This article suggests that employing one logic to the 
exclusion of the other leads to a partial and potentially deceptive account of the 
securitisation process. Rather than continuing an endless dispute between rival ‘schools’, I 
have sought to demonstrate that moving forward together can further enrich our 
understanding of the securitisation process and stimulate theoretical progress.  
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